How Wins Produced Fails with Rondo

I had always wanted to look at the basic on/off statistics with Rondo and the Celtics because I felt he was an overrated point guard, and the 2013 season provided an interesting data set: he went down halfway through the season and the Celtics improved, eventually building up to the point where they found a decent lower seed and gave the Knicks all the trouble they could handle. Rondo is a good case in misleading box score stats. Even though he regularly leads the league in assists and sometimes in steals, he does not have a sizable positive offensive impact on the Celtics -- at times he becomes obsessed with piling up assists, instead of finding the ideal offensive options; the Celtics have been a disappointing offensive team for years, getting worse as Rondo's responsibilities grew even with hall of famers on his team, ranking 24th this season and 27th and 17th the two before; and his horrendous outside shooting leads to teams basically refusing to guard him, sagging off five feet and using his man as a roaming help defender. He's a divisive player, with some loving his tenacity and high assist totals enough to call him a top player and a top 2 point guard, while others prefer a string of different point guards before Rondo and find his offense troubling. Rajon Rondo: unselfish star with a unique game, or surly guard who selfishly pads assists?

This is also another article in a series detailing how Wins Produced fails. Previous editions include Carlos Boozer and Jose Calderon, as well one breaking down how the metric works (and fails.) Rondo is an odd case for Wins Produced at first glance, but now if you know its shortcomings well. Yes, he's an inefficient shooter, but he shoots so rarely that it's not a significant deficit. For his position, he's a great rebounder, which Wins Produced loves, and picks up steals and, of course, plenty of assists. Even just picking up rebounds disproportionately well for your position translates into a high Wins Produced score; just ask Landry Fields, who as a rookie apparently was at the same level as Iguodala, Pierce, and Ginobili in 2011.

For his career, Rondo has an outstanding Wins Produced score, while topping out at around 15 wins in both 2009 and 2010, and sixth in Wins per minute in 2009. He is a bona fide star by this metric, but upon closer examination that is far from the truth.

Methodology

The basis of this small study is to look at how the Celtics fare when Rondo plays compared to how they fare without him. I wanted a simple, transparent method that anyone can follow -- no strange flavors of regression models here. Basketball articles regularly cite team records with and without a player, but those typically run into two problems: 1) it's not adjusted for the strength of the competition, and 2) a small sample size leads to unreliable and noisy results. Points 1 and 2 coupled together lead to crazy conclusions, and it's more common than you think because away games are often chained together and sometimes lead to a buzzsaw week in scheduling like three games in Texas and then one in Oklahoma City.

Games with Rondo are compared to games without Rondo in the same season. If you simply total up stats with and without Rondo over his career, the results will be biased toward seasons in which he's healthy, and those happen to be earlier in his career when Boston was at full strength with a younger Pierce/Garnett/Allen core. (With players who miss a consistent number of games per year like Calderon you can get away with this.) I looked at Boston's record and their adjusted point differential for a given season when Rondo played, and then at their record and point differential when he didn't. The difference is Rondo's impact, and you can total this for every season.

For translating point differential into wins, there's the popular Pythagorean theorem here (scroll down to W) and another simpler formula here (scroll down to P.) With small sample sizes just using win/loss percentage is unreliable. Think about a team that normally wins 75% of its games but plays two without a star, as an extreme example; it'd be impossible to deduce how good they really were without him. I also calculated offensive and defensive efficiency for every game, compiling the results for with/without splits and adjusting for opponent strength in respective off/def efficiency.

Wins Produced makes it easy to estimate how many wins a team loses without a player. TheNBAGeek provides all those stats, where the hardest part was estimate the replacement production. I had two methods: 1) assume replacement level is 0.100 Wins/48 minutes, which is exactly average, and calculate the loss in wins with (Rondo WP/48 mins - 0.100/48 minutes)*Games*Minutes/game, and 2) use the same calculations but find the replacement level by taking the weighted average of his backups, weighing by minutes. For 2), whenever Rondo only missed 1 to 5 games in a season, I just looked at the box scores of games he didn't play and who replaced him with how many minutes, but ultimately that was still tricky because Celtics often had combo guards on the bench like House. For seasons with considerable games missed, I took an average using the top lineups without Rondo (from their top 20 in general) and weighted by minutes. This is not perfect by any stretch, but it's a better estimate than 0.100. However, it's a much better than simply looking at with/without splits, and a replacement level of 0.100 is a conservative estimate used to say, Okay, this is a high guess, and if Rondo can't beat that then there's no contest because their backups are definitely worse than 0.100 WP/48 (Boston's backup point guards have included Stephon Marbury and Nate Robinson.)

Here's a little more detail on how I find statistical significance: in previous editions I used a standard deviation of Wins Produced along with a t-test. The standard deviation comes from a different player and isn't exactly applicable. I've decided to use a different test. The hypothesis is that Wins Produced is accurate in its assessment of how many wins Rondo is worth, but there's game to game variation in how the team wins. This variation is found through the binomial distribution, since games have binary outcomes (win/loss.) The binom.dist function in Excel works well for this, where I find the probability that their actual record is statistically indistinguishable from what Wins Produced says due to natural variation with their specific sample size of games without Rondo.

Results

Tossing out Rondo's rookie season, when he played fewer minutes and it can be argued rookie seasons aren't representative of players, there are 78 games without Rondo and 392 with him, excluding the playoffs. He only missed sizable chunks the past three seasons. Their adjusted point differential (SRS) improved in two of those seasons and got worse in one, 2011, and it's the same for the other three seasons -- only one they improved in was 2009.  The results are detailed below.

	With Rondo					Without Rondo
Season	Games played	Win/loss record (%)	SRS	Pythag. projected wins(1)	SRS projected wins(2)	Games played	Win/loss record (%)	SRS	Pythag. projected wins(1)	SRS projected wins(2)
2008	77	62-15 (80.5)	9.12	63.0 (81.8)	61.6 (80.0)	5	4-1 (80.0)	12.25	4.3 (85.6)	4.5 (90.3)
2009	80	62-18 (77.5)	7.73	60.7 (75.9)	60.4 (75.5)	2	0-2  (0)	-4.01	0.7 (34.5)	0.7 (36.8)
2010	81	49-32 (60.5)	3.35	51.6 (63.7)	49.4 (61.0)	1	1-0 (100)	5.17	0.7 (67.9)	0.7 (67.0)
2011	68	47-21 (69.1)	5.10	46.8 (68.9)	45.4 (68.8)	14	9-5 (64.3)	3.49	9.0 (64.2)	8.6 (61.5)
2012	53	31-22 (58.5)	1.69	32.0 (60.3)	29.5 (55.6)	13	8-5 (61.5)	4.57	8.8 (68.0)	8.5 (65.0)
2013	38	18-20 (47.4)	-1.98	17.8 (46.9)	16.5 (43.5)	43	23-20 (53.5)	0.58	22.6 (25.5)	22.3 (51.9)

(1) Uses the formula points/gm^14/(points/gm^14 + opp points/gm^14) = win %

(2) Uses the formula (SRS*2.7 + 41)/82 = win %

Note that since most of his missed games are in 2013, that year will dominate the analysis, but the pattern of the Celitcs doing fine without him holds up in other years. Even though the Celtics get worse without him in 2011, for example, it wasn't by much considering he's an all-star point guard and the backup was Nate Robinson. The offense collapsed, but the defense clamped down, which is particularly damning for a system like Wins Produced that puts all its defensive eggs into the baskets of individual blocks/steals/rebounds (Rondo's strengths, not Nate's.) However, in our biggest sample set, Boston's offense emerged from the depths when he got injured, and their defense was virtually unchanged -- contrary to popular belief, Boston's resurgence was not from an elite defense finding itself again. So yes, when Boston lost its all-star point guard, the guy who controlled the ball like a quarterback with 11 assists a game, their offense improved by 2.3 points per 100 possessions, even though the replacement was a guy who doesn't really pass, shoot the ball accurately, or shoot the ball often.

		With Rondo			Without Rondo
Season	Wins Produced/ 48 mins	Games played	Adjusted offensive efficiency	Adjusted defensive efficiency	Games played	Adjusted offensive efficiency	Adjusted defensive efficiency
2008	0.185	77	111.5	99.3	5	111.8	98.7
2009	0.269	80	111.7	102.8	2	102.1	106.8
2010	0.247	81	108.5	104.3	1	109.9	104.2
2011	0.233	68	108.1	102.1	14	103.1	98.9
2012	0.211	53	101.9	99.7	13	101.2	95.9
2013	0.193	38	102.3	103.7	43	104.6	103.9

You can't tell directly from the numbers like this, which is why you need to actually watch the action on the court -- they redirected the offense through Pierce and balanced the action throughout the team, instead of Rondo dominating the ball and searching for assists.

But what did Wins Produced say would happen? Totaling the results, the metric predicted the team would basically fall off a sharp ledge without Rondo, who normally is worth 10 to 15 wins a year (according to Wins Produced.) In the table below, Wins Pythagorean is for the calculated number of wins based on team strength from points per game and opposing points per game, while SRS is the same but uses adjusted point differential (i.e. SRS.) Using the binomial test, detailed more in the methodology section, where it uses the win percentage of a team to test whether or not another sample of games is significantly different statistically, Wins Produced was inaccurate in its judgement of Rondo's value. Even when you use the very high estimate of 0.100 WP/48 for Rondo's replacements, the p-value range is in between 0.05 to 0.01 -- 0.05 and 0.01 are the typical rejection marks, meaning it's just on the edge of finding significance. P-value is the probability that Wins Produced's predicted wins was within the actual win percentage, but differed due to natural variability. Note that the real number of wins without Rondo was 45, extremely close to the estimate from SRS.

	Wins Pythagorean RL: .1	Wins SRS  RL: .1	Wins Pythagorean	Wins SRS
Predicted	37.6	35.1	33.0	30.5
Actual	46.0	45.3	46.0	45.3
Difference	-8.4	-10.2	-13.0	-14.8
Binomial test, two-tailed	0.0255	0.0126	0.00213	0.000372

Conclusion

In the past six seasons, Rondo has missed 78 games and the Celtics won 45 games. Wins Produced, the magic metric that uses box score stats to "explain" wins, predicted due to losing Rondo and replacing him with a bench that over the years has included Marbury and Nate Robinson the Celtics would only win 37.6 to 30.5 wins. The high estimate comes from assuming Rondo's replacements would be league average players, which is very optimistic. Looking at his actual replacements, the difference between the predicted and actual wins is comfortably below statistical significance. Wins Produced failed to predict how the Celtics would do without Rondo.

This is the problem with only using box score stats -- they certainly tell a story, but only one of many. In a Rondo-centric offense, the Celtics were a disappointing offensive team and relied on midrange jumpers. An elite playmaker should be creating good shot attempts, like open three-pointers and paint attacks. He had a below average rate proportion of rim assists to total assists and three-point assists to total, which is typical for him. Rondo indeed collects a lot of assists, and plenty of rebounds for a point guard, but they can replaced and most of the time the Celitcs are fine or even better off without him. Then there's the issue of his horrendous shooting. In the modern NBA, help defense and quick rotations are everything. If there is a complete non-shooting threat then the defender is free to roam and help elsewhere on the court. Rondo's defenders give him an absurd amount of space, daring him to shoot so much that he actually had a decent percentage this year from the midrange distance, but not at a rate to swing the results. However, Rondo is insistent on looking for assists and doesn't pressure the defense enough with his own scoring. As a result, for an 11-assist all-star point guard, their offense paradoxically hums right along. You can't see that with Wins Produced.

Edited: fixed offensive and defensive efficiency numbers for 2008 and 2009. They did not disrupt the statistical tests.

Best Shooter of the Past Five Years

Introduction

Who is the best shooter in the NBA?

This question is a popular one, but there are no clear answers. You can bring up someone’s textbook form, how high the player releases the ball, or how quickly the shot is released, but it always goes back to whether or not the player makes the shot. Unfortunately, for most of the NBA’s history there is simply not enough information to reach a definitive conclusion. There’s field goal percentage, but all the jumpers are comingled with inside shots. Shaq’s near 60 percent for his career from the field, and no one confuses him with an excellent shooter. Three pointers are the ultimate weapon of great shooters; however, it’s only been used in the NBA since 1979. And how do you compare a guy who creates his own shot like Larry Bird with a spot-up shooter like Steve Kerr?

Methodology

I’ve given this question my best attempt with a public database that goes back to the 2006-07 season (Hoopdata.com.) Essentially we’re looking at the best shooters of the past five seasons. Shots are divided into zones, and I used three of these zones – shots from 10 to 15 feet, 16 to 23 feet, and beyond the three-point line, as well as free throws (one of the most objective basketball stats.) In a manner similar to what John Hollinger used (found here) I created a composite score based on the percentages from those distances with a few tweaks.

One adjustment was to award guys for unassisted attempts by a multiplier of a maximum 10 percent. This was to help guys who had to create their own shots versus role players who get to wait on the three point line to take one. For example, if a player was never assisted on any of his 16-23 foot field goals, then his percentage from that distance would be multiplied by 1.1. If, however, he was assisted on half, then the multiplier would be 1.05. I did something similar to shot attempts per minute because that roughly correlates with taking more contested and tougher shots. An extra 20 percent was awarded instead of 10, and the maximum allotment was based on the highest per minute attempts from someone with at least 150 attempts. Kobe Bryant had 0.788 attempts from 10 to 15 feet when the maximum was 1.113, so Kobe had a multiplier of 1.139 (0.788/1.113*1.2=1.139.) With his assist multiplier being 1.074, his percentage from that distance was adjusted from 47.8 to 58.5.

In order to compare percentages, everything was standardized from 0 to 1 based on the maximum percentage with 150 attempts. Kobe’s adjusted percentage of 58.5 was changed to 0.955. Then the standardized scores were added with a 33.3 weight to three-pointers and free throws, and 16.7 to the midrange distances. Less weight was given to the latter so everything would be balanced between two-point jump shots, free throws, and three pointers. The weights were also chosen so the composite would be out of 100; think of an academic scale where 90 and above are A’s, 80 and above B’s, etc. A 100 is essentially a percent score for players with enough field goal attempts, although since the 10-15 range is less used for most shooters I let guys qualify for the final rankings with only 100 attempts instead of 150 like the other distances; that meant a score over 100 is possible. I also included an unadjusted composite score built the same way except multipliers for assisted shots and shots/minutes weren’t used.

Results

The results are fascinating. Out of 166 qualifying players from 2006-07 to 2010-11, the top adjusted composite score (ACS) was 99.3 from Steve Nash. Again, a score of 100 is virtually perfect, and the next closest guy was Anthony Morrow at 94.2. The top twenty players are shown in a table below. His dominance is astounding – not only is he the best free throw shooter, but he nearly had the best three-point percentage (although his adjusted three pointer percentage is best) and he had the top marks for unadjusted and adjusted from 10 to 15 feet. He’s also no slouch from 16 to 23 feet. That 51.6 percent from that awkward range? He was only assisted on 6 percent of those.

The rest of the list is intriguing but logical. One surprise is that Morrow is number two, but looking at his numbers you can see why – he’s Nash-like in his percentages from anywhere on the floor. Given that he’s only 26, it’ll be interesting to see where his numbers will end up when he retires. His weakness is that he’s a spot-up shooter, and thus makes easier shots so his adjusted score is lower than his unadjusted composite. Stephen Curry is even younger at 23 years, and if he could improve from 10 to 15 feet and stay upright despite glass ankles he has the only realistic shot at catching up to Nash. Dirk Nowitzki and Ray Allen aren’t surprising because anyone should list them near the top of a best shooters list, but Mo Williams probably is. He’s excellent from every spot, and he’s a point guard instead of a spot-up specialist who scores at a decent rate.

Some players are lower on the list than others would think, but for good reasons. Stojakovic is over 90 at the line, but he shot a lower percentage from both distances inside the three point line than outside. The same problem occurred for Szczerbiak, as my method punished three point specialists who couldn’t hit midrange shots. Kobe Bryant makes the list, helped by his attempts per minute and his mastery of the 10 to 15 foot range, but if Lakers fans complain that he should be even higher due to the high degree of difficulty, then why is his free-throw percentage so low? No one’s guarding him there. (Random note: without the minimum field goal requirement for ACS, Eddy Curry would be sitting on top with a score of 102.8 solely because he was 1 for 1 from behind the three point line. All his other percentages were terrible.)  

Rank	Player	10-15 ft. %	16-23 ft. %	Three pointer %	Free throw %	Composite score	Adj. comp. score
1	Steve Nash	51.6	47.7	44.2	91.7	99.1	99.3
2	Anthony Morrow	49.0	44.7	44.7	88.5	96.5	94.2
3	Stephen Curry	36.9	46.0	43.9	91.1	93.4	92.6
4	Dirk Nowitzki	47.5	48.6	38.6	89.6	93.2	92.2
5	Ray Allen	47.6	45.2	39.7	91.2	93.4	91.6
6	Mo Williams	49.2	45.1	39.4	87.6	92.4	91.5
7	Ben Gordon	43.9	44.6	39.7	87.0	90.5	90.2
8	Jason Kapono	40.0	47.5	44.4	83.5	92.5	89.5
9	Jason Terry	46.9	47.4	38.1	85.3	90.6	89.3
10	Kyle Korver	39.9	45.6	41.3	89.4	91.6	89.1
11	Chauncey Billups	40.8	41.0	38.9	90.8	89.1	88.9
12	Jose Calderon	43.2	46.4	39.5	87.8	91.0	88.4
13	Chris Paul	47.4	43.9	37.4	85.5	89.1	88.2
14	Luke Ridnour	45.6	46.7	37.6	86.3	89.9	88.1
15	Earl Boykins	44.4	39.3	37.4	87.4	87.3	86.3
16	Wally Szczerbiak	39.6	40.4	41.3	86.5	88.7	86.3
17	Kobe Bryant	47.8	40.5	34.3	84.3	85.4	86.2
18	Paul Pierce	44.4	40.8	39.2	83.7	87.8	85.9
19	Rashard Lewis	43.5	41.0	39.4	83.0	87.5	85.8
20	Peja Stojakovic	34.9	38.1	40.5	90.1	87.1	85.8

*Minimum attempts: 100 from 10-15 feet and 150 from the other three distances

There were a few players who just missed the field goal attempts cut-off who warrant mentioning. Steve Novak had an ACS of 96.8, but has rarely gotten to the line and has only taken 12 shots from 10 to 15 feet. After only a rookie year, Gary Neal had an ACS of 91.2; he should qualify with enough attempts after another year. He also deserves to be on a short list of the most underrated shooters in the league. JJ Redick, known more as a sharpshooter than Neal, also should make the top twenty after another year in the league with an ACS of 87.0. Brent Barry nearly made the cut (ACS of 90.3), but needed to shoot more from inside the three point line.

Since I have a score for every player in the league, I have also the ACS for the bad shooters as well. Below is a table showing the twenty worst shooters according to this metric, and to reiterate this is among players who qualified. Otherwise Ben Wallace, DeAndre Jordan, and Andris Biedrins would be competing for this dubious honor. With a terrible score of 60.7, the worst shooter is Josh Smith. He attempted to quit three pointers cold turkey, and based on his numbers I can see why he tried. However, I will note that since it’s three points instead of two it may be better to give up midrange shots instead, although tactically it’s more difficult to completely abstain. Rondo is third, but would be higher if it weren’t for his skill at those awkward shots that sometimes fly from 10 or more feet. It’s surprising to see Spencer Hawes with such a low score because when a seven-footer eschews the inside game for an outside one he better have a good reason. Luckily, this year he has given up and is rebounding and scoring near the basket more than ever.  

Rank	Player	10-15 ft. %	16-23 ft. %	Three pointer %	Free throw %	Composite score	Adj. comp. score
166	Josh Smith	23.9	33.5	28.1	66.7	64.2	60.7
165	Trevor Ariza	17.9	32.7	31.8	66.8	64.8	62.3
164	Rajon Rondo	41.0	38.1	24.2	62.2	66.8	63.8
163	Marquis Daniels	41.8	32.6	22.8	69.2	66.7	64.1
162	Spencer Hawes	36.3	40.4	30.4	63.9	71.3	67.0
161	Corey Brewer	33.6	33.3	31.2	70.0	70.9	67.5
160	Thabo Sefolosha	32.1	37.8	30.5	71.3	71.8	67.6
159	Andre Miller	41.7	39.3	18.0	81.2	69.7	68.2
158	Thaddeus Young	32.4	35.1	33.8	71.6	73.6	69.4
157	Lamar Odom	35.4	40.1	32.2	67.9	73.7	69.7
156	Al Thornton	37.8	35.7	29.3	74.8	73.4	70.3
155	Shawn Marion	39.7	36.3	29.5	77.2	75.2	70.7
154	Devin Brown	27.9	31.9	33.4	78.1	73.1	70.7
153	Jamaal Tinsley	38.2	34.7	29.0	72.7	72.1	70.8
152	Andre Iguodala	28.8	37.8	31.8	74.4	72.9	71.0
151	Antonio Daniels	32.8	36.5	29.5	80.6	74.3	71.2
150	Zach Randolph	34.5	40.6	28.4	77.8	74.4	71.4
149	Luke Walton	36.6	35.4	34.2	72.3	75.6	71.5
148	Jeff Green	31.6	34.4	33.7	77.3	75.1	71.8
147	Rodney Carney	37.6	34.3	33.8	70.4	74.6	71.8

*Minimum attempts: 100 from 10-15 feet and 150 from the other three distances

As a bonus, I’ll also list the top guys from each distance with adjusted (assist rate and attempts per minute) and unadjusted percentages. Nash’s shooting prowess is showcased here very well – he has four out of seven top spots, and in only one category is he not in the top five. There are also a few surprising names – Sean May as a marksmen with a midrange jumper, Shaun Livingston’s skill from 10 to 15, and the forgotten Mikki Moore who lived on two-point jumpers.

10 to 15 feet:

Player	Unadjusted %	Player	Adjusted %
Steve Nash	51.6	Steve Nash	61.2
Beno Udrih	51.2	Dirk Nowitzki	60.3
Mo Williams	49.2	Beno Udrih	59.7
Anthony Morrow	49.0	Shaun Livingston	59.0
Shaun Livingston	47.9	Kobe Bryant	58.5

*Minimum attempts: 150

16 to 23 feet:

Player	Unadjusted %	Player	Adjusted %
Steve Novak	49.2	Dirk Nowitzki	59.5
Sean May	48.7	Steve Nash	57.0
Dirk Nowitzki	48.6	Sean May	56.8
Matt Bonner	48.5	Jose Calderon	56.0
Mikki Moore	48.1	Luke Ridnour	55.8

*Minimum attempts: 150

Three point:

Player	Unadjusted %	Player	Adjusted %
Anthony Morrow	44.7	Steve Nash	51.4
Jason Kapono	44.4	Anthony Morrow	50.3
Steve Nash	44.2	Steve Novak	50.2
Stephen Curry	43.9	Stephen Curry	50.1
Brent Barry	42.5	Gary Neal	49.3

*Minimum attempts: 150

Free throws:

Player	%
Steve Nash	91.7
Ray Allen	91.2
Stephen Curry	91.1
Chauncey Billups	90.8
Peja Stojakovic	90.1

*Minimum attempts: 150

I’m also including the top rates for field goals attempted from the three court ranges. Marc Jackson is a surprising leader, and note this is a former Warriors player and not the current head coach with over 10,000 career assists (he spells his name “Mark.”) In retrospect, maybe 150 was too low a threshold for something like FGA/min, but it ultimately didn’t mess with the rankings. The leading three point shooters per minute is an eclectic list of players who have little in common besides their favorite shot.

10 to 15 feet:

Players	FGA/min
Elton Brand	0.113
Dirk Nowitzki	0.112
Yao Ming	0.101
Jermaine O'Neal	0.096
Sam Cassell	0.089

*Minimum attempts: 150

16 to 23 feet:

Players	FGA/min
Marc Jackson	0.206
Tracy McGrady	0.197
Dirk Nowitzki	0.196
Sam Cassell	0.190
Kobe Bryant	0.180

*Minimum attempts: 150

Three point:

Players	FGA/min
Steve Novak	0.234
J.R. Smith	0.219
Juan Carlos Navarro	0.204
Damon Jones	0.204
Ryan Anderson	0.203

*Minimum attempts: 150

Conclusion

There’s no perfect way to rate a shooter, and maybe there are problems adjusting based on how many shots are assisted and how many you take per minute. The adjustment, however, doesn’t change the rankings too much. Specialists who wait until they’re open are hurt a little like Kapono, and stars who typically take more contested shots like Kobe benefit by moving up a few spots. No matter how you slice the numbers it’s hard not to rate Nash as the best shooter because he’s one of the top from every location and has to lead an offense while doing so. We don’t have data for decades back so we can’t compare him to Larry Bird or Mark Price, but it’s hard to believe anyone who could shoot better. Steve Nash is the greatest shooter of the past five seasons, and he has a legitimate argument for greatest of all time.